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Abstract
The transferable utility hypothesis underlies important theoretical results in
household economics. We provide a revealed preference framework for bringing
this (theoretically appealing) hypothesis to observational data. First, we establish
revealed preference conditions that must be satised for observed household con-
sumption behavior to be consistent with transferable utility. Next, we show that
these conditions are easily testable by means of integer programming methods.
The test is entirely nonparametric, which makes it robust with respect to speci-
cation errors. Finally, we also provide a rst empirical test of the transferable
utility hypothesis through an application to Spanish household data. For the given
households, our test results provide support in favor of the hypothesis.
JEL Classication: C14, DO1, D11, D12, D13.
Keywords: transferable utility hypothesis, generalized quasi-linearity, household
consumption, nonparametric tests, revealed preferences.
1 Introduction
Household consumption analysis takes a prominent position in the microeconomics lit-
erature. In settings with multiple household members, theoretical consumption models
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1often assume transferable utility. As we will explain below, this assumption considerably
simplies the analysis. This paper provides a framework for bringing the (theoretically
appealing) transferable utility hypothesis to empirical data. Specically, we dene the
testable implications of transferable utility in revealed preference terms. In addition,
we provide an application to observational household data, which gives a rst empirical
test of the transferable utility hypothesis.
The transferable utility hypothesis is a popular one in household economics. It un-
derlies important theoretical results in the modeling of household behavior. Probably
the best known example here is Becker (1974)'s Rotten Kid theorem; see Bergstrom
(1989) for an insightful discussion. Bergstrom (1997) provides an extensive review of
(other) applications of the transferable utility hypothesis in theoretical household mod-
els. Essentially, transferable utility means that it is possible to transfer utility from
one household member to another member in a lossless manner, i.e. without aecting
the aggregate household utility. Under transferable utility the frontier of the Pareto set
is always a straight line of slope -1. This makes that the intrahousehold distribution
of resources is independent of the aggregate household decisions: individual household
members will always behave so as to maximize the size of the Pareto set.
The transferable utility assumption is popular because it has several highly desirable
implications. First of all, it guarantees that household demand behavior displays at-
tractive aggregation properties. In particular, any household then satises the so-called
unitary model of household consumption, which means that aggregate household demand
behaves as if it were generated by a single individual. However, as we will also discuss
further on, consistency with the unitary model does not necessarily imply consistency
with transferable utility, i.e. unitary household behavior is necessary but not sucient
for transferable utility. Next, the transferable utility hypothesis considerably facilitates
welfare analysis. As the distribution of resources over the dierent household mem-
bers does not inuence the household decisions, welfare analysis can focus exclusively
on the aggregate utility/welfare. Generally, utilizing the transferable utility hypothesis
makes life of household economists a lot easier. Nevertheless, despite its wide prevalence
in theoretical work, the empirical implications of transferable utility have hardly been
studied. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the hypothesis has never been tested on
observational data.
This paper lls this gap: we develop tools for investigating the empirical realism of
the transferable utility hypothesis. More specically, we establish revealed preference
conditions for observed consumption behavior to be consistent with the transferable util-
ity assumption under Pareto ecient household behavior. These conditions are easily
testable as they only require observations on consumed quantities at the household level
and corresponding prices; testing the conditions can use standard integer programming
methods. In addition, the test is entirely nonparametric, i.e. its empirical implementa-
tion does not require a prior (typically non-veriable) functional structure for the utility
functions of the individuals in the household.
We not only establish the testable conditions of transferable utility, but also provide
a rst empirical test of the hypothesis. Specically, we apply our revealed preference
conditions to Spanish household consumption data. We assess the empirical support
2for transferable utility by means of two complementary exercises. First, we conduct
our basic revealed preference test for consistency of observed household behavior with
transferable utility. This test is a `sharp' one in that it abstracts from measurement
error in the consumption data. As such, this rst exercise will check whether observed
consumption behavior is `exactly' consistent with transferable utility. In our second
exercise, we consider an extension of our basic test that does account for the possibility
of measurement error. Here, we compute the minimal data adjustments that are needed
for obtaining consistency with transferable utility. Essentially, for behavior that is not
exactly consistent with transferable utility, this will tell us how `close' it is to such
consistency.
At this point, is worth indicating that the usefulness of our following results is not
restricted to household settings. The transferable utility hypothesis is also pervasive
in many other areas of economics. For example, in cooperative game theory the hy-
pothesis is used to determine the value of a coalition and underlies notions such as the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965) and the nucleolus
(Schmeidler, 1969). Next, it is a critical assumption in the Shapley-Shubik assignment
model (Shapley and Shubik, 1972), which has become a workhorse in the study of labor
and marriage markets and other models of two-sided matching. Furthermore, transfer-
able utility is crucial for the validity of the famous Coase theorem (see Coase (1960)
and Hurwicz (1995)). Lastly, the hypothesis is also frequently used in principal-agent
models, theoretical mechanism design, matching models, public economics, industrial
organization, international trade, and so on.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we briey recapture
some important building blocks for our following analysis, and we articulate our own
contributions to the existing literature. Here, we will also indicate that the so-called
generalized quasi-linear (GQL) utility specication provides a necessary and sucient
condition for a Pareto optimal household allocation rule to be consistent with transfer-
able utility. In Section 3, we then formally dene this GQL specication. Section 4
subsequently presents the corresponding revealed preference characterization. Section 5
provides the integer programming formulation of our characterization and presents the
empirical application. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Testable implications of transferable utility
Generalized quasi-linearity. To dene the testable implications of transferable util-
ity at the household level, we need to characterize the underlying utility functions of the
individuals within the household. The best-known specication leading to the property
of transferable utility is the quasi-linear (QL) utility specication. This specication
requires the utility functions of the individuals to be linear in at least one good, usually
called the numeraire. Unfortunately, QL utility has strong and unrealistic implications
(e.g. absence of income eects for all but a single good, risk neutrality, etc.).
In the presence of public goods, Bergstrom and Cornes (1981, 1983) and Bergstrom
(1989) showed that a weaker form than QL utility equally implies transferable utility, i.e.
3so-called `generalized' quasi-linear (GQL) utility (a term coined by Chiappori (2010)).
Interestingly, these authors also showed that this GQL specication provides a necessary
and sucient condition for transferable utility under Pareto ecient household behavior.
The GQL form can be obtained from the QL specication through multiplication of the
numeraire by a function dened in terms of the bundle of (intra-household) public goods.
The additional requirement that this function is common to all individuals within the
household provides the property of transferable utility. As households typically consume
a large amount of public goods, this characterization of transferable utility is particularly
convenient in household settings.
Recently, Chiappori (2010) derived a set of necessary and sucient conditions on the
(aggregate) household demand function such that it is compatible with a Pareto ecient
allocation where household members are endowed with GQL utility functions. As far
as we know, this is the rst (and {up till now{ sole) study that makes the testable im-
plications of transferable utility explicit. In view of our following exposition, we remark
that Chiappori adopted a so-called `dierential' approach to characterizing GQL utility:
he focused on testable (dierential) properties of the household demand function to be
consistent with transferable utility. Practical applications of this dierential approach
then typically require a prior parametric specication of this demand function, which is
to be estimated from the data. As we will indicate below, this implies a most notable
dierence with the approach that we follow here.
Revealed preference implications. We complement Chiappori's ndings by estab-
lishing testable conditions of transferable utility (or GQL utility) in the revealed pref-
erence tradition of Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973)
and Varian (1982). In contrast to the dierential approach, this revealed preference
approach obtains conditions that can be veried by (only) using a nite set of house-
hold consumption observations (i.e. prices and quantities) and, thus, it does not require
the estimation of a household demand function. As such, a main advantage of these
revealed preference conditions is that they allow a nonparametric analysis of the data:
they do not impose any functional form on the utility function (generating a particular
household demand function) except for usual regularity conditions.
More specically, we get necessary and sucient conditions that enable checking
consistency of a given data set with transferable utility. In the spirit of Varian (1982),
we refer to this as `testing' data consistency with transferable utility. As for the prac-
tical application of this test, we will show that our revealed preference conditions can
be equivalently reformulated as integer programming constraints. This integer program-
ming formulation allows us to test data consistency with transferable utility by applying
standard integer programming solution techniques.
Our empirical application in Section 5 will demonstrate the empirical usefulness of
this integer programming approach. In this respect, it is worth pointing out that a sim-
ilar integer programming approach has been fruitfully applied for a revealed preference
analysis of household consumption behavior; see, for example, Cherchye, De Rock, and
Vermeulen (2011a) and Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2011b). Our study comple-
4ments these earlier studies by further illustrating the versatility of integer programming
techniques for analyzing household consumption in revealed preference terms. Cherchye,
Demuynck, and De Rock (2011c) also provide a theoretical analysis of the computational
complexity of revealed preference conditions for general equilibrium models that are for-
mally close to the transferable utility conditions that we study here. In principle, this
analysis could be translated to our setting but, for compactness, we will not do this in
the current paper.
Further contributions. At this point, it is worth to indicate two further important
dierences between our study and the original study of Chiappori (2010), which involve
two additional contributions. First, to establish his characterization, Chiappori assumed
observability of the numeraire good. However, in practice this numeraire good is typically
an `outside' good, i.e. the amount of money not spent on observed consumption, which
is usually not recorded in real-life applications (including our own application). Given
this, our following revealed preference analysis will principally focus on characterizing
transferable utility for the case with an unobserved numeraire (or outside good). To
obtain this characterization, we will rst have to establish the characterization that
applies to an observed numeraire.
Another main dierence between our study and the one of Chiappori is that we
present an empirical application that eectively brings our testable implications to ob-
servational data. As indicated above, as far as we know, this provides a rst empirical
test of the transferable utility hypothesis. Specically, we verify our revealed preference
conditions for a sample of households drawn from the Encuesta Continua De Presupestos
Familiares (ECPF), a Spanish consumer expenditure survey. In general, our results are
mixed. Although we nd the assumption of transferable utility to be realistic for a con-
siderable part of the households under consideration, there is also a substantial share
of households whose behavior contradicts the transferable utility assumption. Given
this, we will explore the possibility to rationalize observed consumption behavior by
accounting for (a little) measurement error.
As a nal remark, we indicate that Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) recently developed
a revealed preference characterization of the QL utility specication. By focusing on the
GQL utility form, we provide revealed preference conditions for a model that contains
this QL specication as a special case. In addition, in our empirical exercise we will
compare the empirical goodness of the GQL and QL specications. A main conclusion
here will be that, for the given households, the GQL utility specication provides a
better t of the observed consumption behavior than the QL specication.
3 Generalized quasi-linear utility
Consider a household with M ( 2) members. Each member m ( M) consumes
a bundle of N + 1 private goods (qm;xm) 2 R
N+1
+ and a bundle of K public goods
Q 2 RK
+. The private good xm denotes member m's amount of the numeraire. For each
5m, we assume xm > 0 in what follows.1 In addition, we normalize by setting the price of
the numeraire equal to one. Next, the vector p 2 RN
++ represents the normalized price
vector for the bundle of private goods qm, while the vector P 2 RK
++ is the normalized
price vector for the bundle of public goods Q.
Utility of member m is represented by the strictly increasing and quasi-concave utility
function um(qm;xm;Q). The utility functions um are said to be of the generalized quasi-
linear (GQL) form if there exist a (member-specic) function bm : R
K+N
+ ! R and a
(common) function a : RK








Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) have shown that member-specic GQL utilities are nec-
essary and sucient for transferable utility under Pareto ecient household behavior.2
The GQL specication encompasses the quasi-linear (QL) specication as a special
case. Specically, if a(Q) = a for all Q (i.e. the function value a(Q) is everywhere the








However, if a(Q) varies with the level of public goods, then the GQL specication vastly
expands the range of utility functions compatible with transferable utility.
We assume that household decisions are made according to the Pareto criterion:
allocations are chosen such that no member can be made better of without reducing
the utility of some other household member.3 In this case, any equilibrium allocation
(q1;:::;qM;x1;:::;xM;Q) minimizes total household expenditures subject to the con-
straint that every member of the household receives at least some predened level of
utility  um. In other words, given a xed vector of utility levels ( u1;:::;  uM) 2 RM
+ ,

















m)   u
m (8m  M):
In view of our following analysis, we develop an equivalent formulation of OP.1.
To obtain the formulation, we rst observe that each constraint will be binding in the
solution of OP.1 because the utility functions um are strictly increasing. Using this, and
because xm > 0 for all m, we can substitute the restrictions in the objective function.
1Just like for quasi-linearity, we need a non-zero amount of the numeraire in order to have transferable
utility.
2See also Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2011, p. 276) for a detailed discussion of this functional
specication.
3See Chiappori (1988) and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007, 2009, 2011a) for revealed pref-
erence tests of the assumption of Pareto optimality, without the additional assumption of transferable
utility.




























From this equivalent formulation, it is directly clear that the optimal solution of
problem OP.1 only depends on the total amount of utility
PM
m  um but not on the specic
distribution of this amount over the dierent household members. This demonstrates
the property of transferable utility under GQL.
Standard rst order conditions characterize the (interior) solutions of problem OP.2
if the function  is convex and the functions m are concave. Bergstrom and Cornes
(1983) showed that these requirements are equivalent to the condition that the utility
functions um are quasi-concave (which we assumed before). Next, it is easy to verify
that  is decreasing in Q while the m are increasing in q. In what follows, we will
further assume that the functions m are also increasing in Q; this condition is sucient
for um to be increasing in Q.
For an optimal solution (q1;:::;qM;x1;:::;xM;Q) of problem OP.2, the rst






















Conditions (foc.1) and (foc.2) provide a formal expression of the household's marginal
decision rules for the public and private goods, respectively. Next, condition (foc.3) com-
plies with the GQL utility specication in (1). The rst order conditions (foc.1)-(foc.3)
provide a useful starting point for developing our revealed preference characterization in
the next section.
4 Revealed preference characterization
We analyze the (aggregate) consumption behavior of a household with M individuals,
by starting from a nite set T of observed household choices. For each observation
t 2 T, we know the privately and publicly consumed quantities qt and Qt, as well as
4If  or  are not dierentiable we may take the sub- and superdierentials that satisfy the corre-
sponding rst order conditions. We will also use this in the proof of Proposition 1.
7the corresponding prices pt and Pt. Remark that we only observe the aggregate private
quantities qt and not the member-specic quantities qm
t . In a rst instance we assume
that the aggregate amount of the numeraire (`outside') good at every t (i.e. xt) is also
observed (again we assume that the member-specic quantities xm
t are not observed).
We will relax this assumption later on. As discussed before, we believe an unobserved
numeraire is a more realistic assumption for real life applications.
Numeraire observed. If the consumption of the numeraire is observed, then the
relevant data set is S = fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T. In what follows, we present necessary and
sucient conditions for the set S to be rationalizable in terms of GQL utility functions,
i.e. there exist functions  and m so that each bundle (xt;qt;Qt) (t 2 T) leads to a
solution for OP.2. This provides a characterization of transferable utility in the revealed
preference tradition. Our starting denition is the following:
Denition 1 (TU-rationalizable) The data set S = fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T is trans-
ferable utility (TU)-rationalizable if (i) there exist a convex and decreasing function
 : RK
+ ! R and M concave and increasing functions m : R
N+K
+ ! RN and (ii), for
each t, there exist private consumption bundles q1
t;:::;qM
t that sum to qt and strictly
positive numbers x1
t;:::;xM
t that sum to xt such that fq1
t;:::;qM
t ;Qtg solves OP.2 given










Of course, the above denition could equally well have been stated by using the
functions a and bm and by referring to program OP.1. We opt for the current statement
to enhance the interpretation of the revealed preference characterization below.
It follows from Denition 1 that the concept of TU-rationalizability implicitly de-
pends on the number of individuals within the household. However, as the following
result shows, this qualication is actually irrelevant in view of practical applications: it
is empirically impossible to distinguish between dierent household sizes; there exists a
rationalization of the set S in terms of a single individual (i.e. M = 1) if and only if
there exists one in terms of any number of individuals. More specically, we can prove
the following result:5
Proposition 1 Consider a data set S = fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T. The following state-
ments are equivalent:
1. The data set S is TU-rationalizable for a household of M individuals;
2. The data set S is TU-rationalizable for a household of a single individual;
5Appendix A contains the proofs of our main results.







that, for all t;v 2 T:
t   v  

v(Qt   Qv); (RP.1)
t   v  pv(qt   qv) + 














The equivalence between statements 1 and 2 demonstrates the aggregation property
of the transferable utility assumption that we mentioned above: if a data set is TU-
rationalizable for a household of M individuals, then it is rationalizable for a single
individual (endowed with a GQL utility function), and vice versa.6 Statement 3 then
provides the combinatorial conditions that characterize the collection of data sets that
are TU-rationalizable. The rst two conditions ((RP.1) and (RP.2)) dene so-called
Afriat inequalities (see also our discussion of Afriat's Theorem in Appendix C) that
apply to our specic setting. In terms of Denition 1 these inequalities correspond to,
respectively, the (convex) function  and the (concave) function  (where we drop the





then represent the gradient vectors of these functions in terms of the public goods bundle.
Finally, the conditions (RP.3) and (RP.4) give the revealed preference counterparts of
the rst order conditions (foc.1) and (foc.3) that we discussed in the previous section.
Numeraire unobserved. In real life applications the amount of the numeraire good
is usually not observed. For example, this will also be the case in our own application.
The relevant data set is then given as S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T.
Interestingly, the result in Proposition 1 enables us to establish a characterization of
transferable utility for such a data set S. Specically, we can derive the following result:
Proposition 2 Consider a data set S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T. The following statements
are equivalent:
1. For all t 2 T, there exist xt 2 R++ such that fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T is TU-rationalizable
for a household of M individuals (or, equivalently, a single individual);
2. For all t 2 T, there exist UA
t ;UB
t 2 R+, A
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t = Pt: (RP.7)
6Chiappori (2010) obtained a similar result in his dierential setting.
9When compared to the characterization in Proposition 1, the conditions (RP.5),
(RP.6) and (RP.7) in Proposition 2 correspond to (RP.1), (RP.2) and (RP.3), respec-
tively. We refer to the proof of the result for an explicit construction. This proof also
shows that, for each observation t, we can always construct a numeraire quantity xt that
meets condition (RP.4) if the data satisfy (RP.5)-(RP.7).
Nested models. To conclude this section, we discuss the relationship between the
transferable utility conditions developed above and closely related rationalizability con-
ditions that have been considered in the revealed preference literature. Specically, we
make explicit how the transferable utility model is situated `between' the quasi-linear
(QL) utility model and the unitary model. This further claries the interpretation of
our revealed preference characterization of transferable utility.
As a rst exercise, we recall from the previous section that QL utility imposes that the
function value (Q) is constant for all Q. In terms of the characterization in Proposition
1, this means that the gradient vector 

t equals zero. One can then easily verify that
the conditions (RP.1)-(RP.4) reduce to
t   v  pt(qt   qv) + Pt(Qt   Qv): (RP.8)
This condition is necessary and sucient for data consistency with the QL utility spec-
ication.7 We observe that the QL condition (RP.8) is independent of the level of the
numeraire (xt), which implies a notable dierence with our above characterization of
GQL utility. In fact, this independence is also revealed by the fact that the conditions
(RP.5)-(RP.7) in Proposition 2 equally coincide with (RP.8) if we set PA
t equal to zero
for all t 2 T (which has a similar meaning as 

t = 0 in Proposition 1).
Next, it directly follows from statement 2 in Proposition 1 that the transferable utility
model is nested in the unitary model. In fact, in Appendix B we show that conditions
(RP.1)-(RP.4) automatically require that the data satisfy the Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preference (GARP), which is necessary and sucient for data consistency
with the unitary model.8 In other words, if a household data set is TU-rationalizable
then the household acts as a single individual. However, a household may well behave as
if it were a single decision maker without satisfying transferable utility. In this sense, our
revealed preference conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 capture the additional restrictions
that observed consumption behavior must satisfy for the transferable utility assumption
to hold. Our conditions eectively allow for bringing these specic restrictions of TU-
rationalizability to empirical data.
In this respect, one further point relates to Proposition 2. This result makes clear that
transferable utility has testable implications even if the numeraire good is not observed.
7In fact, condition (RP.8) is equivalent to the revealed preference condition that Brown and Cal-
samiglia (2007) originally derived for data consistency with the QL specication.
8See the next section (Denition 2) for a formal denition of GARP. In this respect, we also refer
to Afriat's Theorem that we recapture in Appendix C. This result states the conditions for a price-
quantity set to be rationalizable in terms of a single utility function. As such, it actually provides the
revealed preference characterization of the unitary model that complements our characterization of the
transferable utility model.
10(And, as we will show in the next section, these implications may actually be fairly strong
for observational data.) By contrast, following a revealed preference approach similar
to ours, Varian (1988) has shown that the unitary model does not have any testable
implications as soon as we do not observe the consumption quantity of some good (in
casu the numeraire quantity xt). We believe this is an interesting observation, as it
suggests that considering the transferable utility model may be empirically meaningful
even if the unitary model is non-testable. (In fact, it also motivates why we will not
consider tests of the unitary model in our following application, which focuses on a
setting with an unobserved numeraire.)
5 Empirical application
In this section, we will use the above revealed preference characterization to empirically
assess the validity of the transferable utility hypothesis for Spanish household data. As
indicated in the Introduction, our application consists of two complementary exercises.
In a rst step, we consider the basic revealed preference tests as they have been intro-
duced above. It follows from our exposition that these tests are `sharp', in the following
sense: either a data set exactly satises the data consistency conditions or it does not;
the tests abstract from possible measurement error in the consumption data. In this ex-
ercise, an important focus will be on comparing the empirical performance of the GQL
and QL utility specications. Here, a main result will be that a considerable part of the
households under evaluation passes the GQL (or transferable utility) test while failing
the QL test. To fairly assess this dierence, we also consider the discriminatory power
of the two tests under study; this should account for a possible trade-o between power
and pass rates.
In our second step, we then introduce an extension of our basic tests that does
account for the possibility of measurement error. Specically, we compute the minimal
data adjustments that we need for making behavior consistent with transferable utility
(i.e. rationalizable in terms of GQL utility functions). Essentially, if the observed
behavior of some household does not exactly t transferable utility, this will tell us how
`close' the household data are to such an exact t. Like before, we do not merely study
the GQL specication, but also compare the results for this specication with those for
the QL specication. This should provide complementary information on the empirical
validity of transferable utility as well as the relative empirical performance of the two
utility specications.
As we motivated before, our following analysis will concentrate on the case where the
quantity of the numeraire good is not observed. Before presenting our data and results,
we rst introduce the integer programming formulation of the conditions (RP.5)-(RP.7)
in Proposition 2.
Integer programming formulation. The conditions (RP.6) and (RP.7) in Proposi-
tion 2 are linear and therefore easily veriable, while the Afriat inequalities in condition
(RP.5) are quadratic (i.e. nonlinear in the unknown t's and PA
t 's). From a practical
11point of view, this nonlinearity makes it dicult to empirically verify the characteriza-
tion in Proposition 2. However, these Afriat inequalities can be equivalently restated in
terms of linear (mixed) binary integer programming constraints by making use of the
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP); this follows from Afriat's Theo-
rem that we recapture in Appendix C. As is well known, linear (mixed) binary integer
programming problems can be solved more eciently than programs with quadratic
constraints.9
Let us consider a general setting with a set Z = fwl;ylgl2L containing (strictly
positive) price vectors wl and (positive) quantity vectors yl. Then the GARP condition
is as follows:
Denition 2 Consider a set Z = fwl;ylgl2L. For any l1;l2 2 L, yl1Ryl2 if wl1yl1 
wl1yl2. Next, yl1Ryl2 if there exists a sequence r;:::;t (with r;:::;t 2 L) such that
yl1Ryr,...,ytRyl2. The set Z satises GARP if, for all l1;l2 2 L, yl1Ryl2 implies
wl2yl1  wl2yl2. We refer to R as a revealed preference relation.
We now have the following proposition, which makes use of the binary variables rt;v.
Proposition 3 Consider a data set S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T. The following statements
are equivalent:
1. For all t 2 T, there exist xt 2 R++ such that fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T is TU-rationalizable
for a household of M individuals (or, equivalently, a single individual);
2. For all t;v 2 T, there exist rt;v 2 f0;1g;UA
t ;UB
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t = Pt; (IP.2)
P
A
t (Qt   Qv) < rt;vC; (IP.3)
rt;v + rv;s  1 + rt;s; (IP.4)
P
A
t (Qt   Qv)  (1   rv;t)C; (IP.5)
with C a given number exceeding all observed PtQt.
The linear inequalities (IP.1) and (IP.2) are clearly identical to (RP.6) and (RP.7).
Further, the nonlinear inequalities (RP.5) have been replaced by the linear inequalities
(IP.3)-(IP.5) that make use of real and binary variables. More specically, (IP.3)-(IP.5)
correspond to the GARP condition in Denition 2 in which we take wl = PA
l and
yl = Ql.
9Specically, by adding for any binary variable r the constraints 0  r  1 and r2 = r, we can
easily convert any linear (mixed) binary integer programming problem into a problem with quadratic
constraints.
12To explain the inequalities (IP.3)-(IP.5), we interpret the variables rt;v in terms of
the revealed preference relation R, i.e. rt;v = 1 corresponds to QtRQv. The constraint
(IP.3) then imposes QtRQv (or rt;v = 1) whenever PA
t Qt  PA
t Qv. Next, the constraint
(IP.4) complies with transitivity of the relation R: if QtRQv (rt;v = 1) and QvRQs
(rv;s = 1), then QtRQs (rt;s = 1). Finally, the constraint (IP.5) states that, if QvRQt
(rv;t = 1), then we must have PA
t Qt  PA
t Qv.
For a given data set S, we can verify the above linear inequalities by using mixed
integer linear programming techniques. Given the result in Proposition 3, this eectively
checks whether the set S is consistent with transferable utility (i.e. rationalizable in
terms of GQL utility functions).
Application set-up. Our data are drawn from the Encuesta Continua de Presupestos
Familiares (ECPF). The ECPF is a quarterly budget survey (1985{1997) that interviews
about 3200 Spanish households on their consumption expenditures. For each household,
the data provides consumption observations for a maximum of eight consecutive quarters.
See Browning and Collado (2001) and Crawford (2010) for a more detailed explanation
of this data set.
For obvious reasons, we focus on households with at least two household members.
Next, all households in our sample are headed by a married couple where the husband
is full time employed and the wife is outside the labor force. Finally, we exclude all
households with less then eight observations. In the end, this obtains a panel with 1585
households.
For each household, we have consumption data (quantities and prices) for 15 non-
durable consumption goods: (i) food and non-alcoholic drinks at home; (ii) alcohol; (iii)
tobacco; (iv) energy at home (heating by electricity); (v) services at home (heating: not
electricity, water, furniture repair); (vi) nondurables at home (cleaning products); (vii)
non-durable medicines; (viii) medical services; (ix) transportation; (x) petrol; (xi) leisure
(cinema, theater, clubs for sports); (xii) personal services; (xiii) personal nondurables
(toothpaste, soap); (xiv) restaurants and bars and (xv) traveling (holiday). We will treat
energy at home, services at home and nondurables at home as our three public goods.
To obtain normalized prices, we deate the price (index) for each good (category) by
the value of the consumer price index in the corresponding quarter.
To avoid (debatable) preference homogeneity assumptions across similar households,
we will consider each household separately in our following analysis. In other words,
we consider a dierent data set S = fpt; Pt; qt; Qtgt2T for every individual household.
This practice eectively accounts for inter-household heterogeneity and, thus, optimally
exploits the panel structure of our data set.
Pass rates and power. We rst consider the basic tests of our rationalizability condi-
tions, which do not account for measurement error in the household consumption data.
In what follows, we do not only consider the mere test results but also the discrimina-
tory power of the two (GQL and QL) rationalizability conditions under study. Indeed,
Bronars (1987) and, more recently, Andreoni and Harbaugh (2008) and Beatty and
13Crawford (2010) -rather convincingly- argue that revealed preference test results (indi-
cating pass or fail of the data for some behavioral condition) should be complemented
with power measures to obtain a fair empirical assessment of the condition under eval-
uation. Favorable test results (i.e. a high pass rate for some given data), which prima
facie suggest a good empirical t, have little value if the test has little discriminatory
power (i.e. the condition is hard to reject for the data at hand).
For both rationalizability conditions under evaluation, we compute a power measure
for every individual household. This measure quanties discriminatory power in terms
of the probability to detect random behavior, and is constructed as follows. We model
random behavior by using a bootstrap procedure: we simulate 1000 random series of
eight consumption choices by constructing, for each of the eight observed household
budgets, a random quantity bundle exhausting the given budget (for the corresponding
prices). We construct these quantity bundles by randomly drawing (with replacement)
budget shares (for the 15 goods) from the set of 12680 (= 8 x 1585) observed house-
hold choices in our data set. The power measure is then calculated as one minus the
proportion of these randomly generated consumption series that are consistent with the
rationalizability condition under evaluation. By using this bootstrap method, our power
assessment gives information on the expected distribution of violations under random
choice, while incorporating information on the households' actual choices.10
Table 1 presents our results. The rst column in the table gives the pass rates for
the two rationalizability conditions. Each pass rate gives the proportion of households
in our sample that meets a particular (GQL or QL) condition. A rst observation is
that the GQL condition does not allow us to rationalize all consumption behavior in our
sample. Still, we nd that about half of all households (i.e. 45%) are consistent with
the GQL specication. For these households, we cannot reject the transferable utility
hypothesis. By contrast, the QL utility specication appears to be overly stringent for
the current data set: not a single household passes the corresponding rationalizability
condition.
The remaining columns of Table 1 report on the power distribution for the two ratio-
nalizability tests. First, for the QL specication we obtain that the power distribution
is almost entirely centered around unity, which reveals a (nearly) 100% probability of
rejecting random behavior for each individual household. At this point, we note that
this high power should not be too surprising given our previous nding that the QL
condition is rejected for every household in our sample. Next, we observe that the dis-
criminatory power is rather substantially lower for the GQL test than for the QL test.
However, the GQL test has reasonable power for a considerable part of the households;
see, for example, the median, 3rd quartile and max values in Table 1. Figure 1 provides
a corresponding kernel estimation of the GQL power distribution. A notable observa-
tion is that this distribution is bimodal with peaks around 0.15 and 0.5. Overall, our
results reveal quite some variation in the power of the GQL test: it is fairly low for some
household but considerably high for other households.
10We refer to Bronars (1987) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (2008) for a general discussion on alterna-
tive procedures to evaluate power in the context of revealed preference tests such as ours.
14Table 1: Pass rates and power
condition pass rate power
mean min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
QL 0 1 0.998 1 1 1 1
GQL 0.451 0.4121 0.107 0.264 0.465 0.531 0.673
Figure 1: Power






As a further investigation, we consider two additional power distributions for the
GQL test. Specically, we compare the power distribution for the group of households
that pass the test (pass group) with the one for the group of households that fail the
test (fail group). Table 2 gives the results. Not very surprisingly, we observe a trade-
o between power and pass rate for the GQL test: the power distribution for the fail
group generally dominates the distribution for the pass group. Interestingly, however,
this trade-o seems to be not very prevalent. For example, the dierences between the
min, median, 3rd quartile and max values in Table 2 are rather small. In our opinion,
this indicates that the better t of the transferable utility model for the pass group can
hardly be attributed to a lower power of the GQL test for this group (as compared to
the fail group).
Predictive success. As an additional exercise, we compute a predictive success mea-
sure for the two conditions that we study. This measure was recently introduced and
15Table 2: Power for pass and fail groups
group power
mean min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
pass 0.364 0.107 0.178 0.406 0.511 0.656
fail 0.451 0.109 0.404 0.489 0.549 0.673
axiomatized by Beatty and Crawford (2010) and is based on an original proposal of
Selten (1991). It combines the pass rate and power of a particular behavioral condition
into a single metric: for each household, it subtracts 1 minus the power measure from
the pass measure (1 or 0). As such, the predictive success measure can be interpreted as
a power-adjusted pass rate. The measure is always situated between -1 and 1. Gener-
ally, a higher predictive success value then reveals a better empirical performance of the
behavioral condition that is subject to testing. More specically, a predictive success
value that is close to -1 pertains to a household that fails the rationalizability condition
(i.e. pass measure equals 0) even though the power of the test is low (i.e. close to
0). Conversely, a predictive success value close to 1 indicates a household that passes
the condition (i.e. pass measure equals 1) in a situation where this condition has high
power (i.e. close to 1). Finally, a predictive success value that equals exactly zero means
that the condition is not informative for the household at hand: the condition does not
perform any better than the (uninformative) assumption that households exhibit ran-
dom consumption behavior (for which the power is 0 and the pass measure equals 1, by
construction). For a given household, we will use this zero value as a natural threshold
value to identify a rationalizability condition as a `bad' condition (if predictive success
is below zero) or a `good' condition (if predictive success is above zero).
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the predictive success measures that are
relevant here. These statistics tell us about the empirical performance of the two ra-
tionalizability conditions at the aggregate level of our sample (with 1585 households).
As a rst observation, we note that the distribution is centered around zero for the
QL condition, with (almost) no variation across observations. In fact, we could have
expected this result on the basis of the 0% pass rate and (nearly) 100% power results
that we presented before. Given the above, this suggests that the QL condition is not
informative for the data at hand. By contrast, the pattern seems to be more indicative
for the GQL condition. Like for the QL condition, we again get that the mean predictive
success score is close to zero, but now there is more variation across households.
To provide a better view of this cross-household variation, Figure 2 depicts an esti-
mation of the predictive success distribution for the GQL condition. Interestingly, the
gure reveals a clear bimodal pattern: the distribution achieves a rst peak around -0.55
and a second peak around 0.5. One possible interpretation of this bimodalility is that
it suggests a particular split-up of our original sample of households: for a substantial
16Table 3: Predictive success
condition mean min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
QL 0 -0.002 0 0 0 0
GQL -0.136 -0.891 -0.523 -0.396 0.375 0.656
group of households the GQL condition can be identied empirically as a `good' one,
whereas it is a rather `bad' condition for the remaining households. In turn, this indi-
cates that the adequacy of the GQL condition may depend on the specic household
(characteristics) at hand. In this respect, we have compared observable characteristics
(in our data set) for the two household groups, i.e. households with predictive success
above zero (for which GQL is a `good' condition) and households with predictive success
below zero (for which GQL is a `bad' condition). We considered the following charac-
teristics: age of the household head, number of household members, specialized worker
occupation and home ownership. However, we found no statistical dierences between
the two subsamples. A (tentative) conclusion can be that other (unobserved) household
characteristics drive the adequacy of the GQL condition.
Figure 2: Predictive success





Measurement error. So far, we have considered basic tests for the GQL and QL
conditions. As we mentioned before, these are sharp tests that do not account for mea-
surement error. They only tell us whether households are exact optimizers in terms of
17a particular behavioral (GQL or QL) condition for the data at hand. Obviously, this is
a demanding premise since consumption data are often contaminated by (small) error.
From this perspective, it seems useful to complement our rst assessment with a second
exercise which, for household behavior violating the sharp rationalizability conditions,
evaluates how close observed behavior is to rationalizability once we account for mea-
surement error. Therefore, in what follows we concentrate on an extension of the basic
tests that seeks minimal data adjustments needed for exact consistency with the behav-
ioral conditions under study. For our specic application, we here focus on adjustments
of the price data. This follows Crawford (2010), who motivates the possibility of price
errors for the sample at hand.11 Our following method for dealing with (price) errors
essentially adapts an idea of Varian (1985), who originally focused on revealed prefer-
ence analysis of the unitary model. After introducing the method, we will present (and
compare) our empirical results for the GQL and QL specications.
For each observation t, we let the vectors "t and t represent the measurement
errors in the prices of, respectively, the private goods (pt) and the public goods (Pt).
We assume that these errors are independently normally distributed with zero mean and
variance 2;  t and t stand for the diagonal matrices with as diagonal entries 1 + "t;n
and 1+t;k.12 Then, we have that the observed prices pt and Pt are related to the `true'
(but unobserved) prices ~ pt and ~ Pt in the following way:
~ pt =  tpt and ~ Pt = tPt; (2)
We note that we assume a multiplicative error structure. This allows for a higher variance
associated with higher prices, which is intuitively plausible. It will also simplify the
interpretation of our following empirical results.
Using (2), we can reformulate our revealed preference conditions in terms of the true
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v = vPv: (IP.2-e)
Now, if consumption is not consistent with the conditions (IP.1)-(IP.5), we know
that we will need "t and t dierent from zero to satisfy the conditions (IP.1-e), (IP.2-e)
and (IP.3)-(IP.5). As we do not now the true values of the errors "t and t (because
the true prices are unobserved), we compute the minimal sum of squared errors that
makes the data satisfy these last conditions. This can eectively be interpreted in terms
of the minimal price adjustments needed for obtaining consistency with the behavioral
condition subject to evaluation; it quanties how close observed behavior is to such




(b "tb "t + b tb t)
11However, it should be clear that our following method is easily accommodated to account for
quantity errors in (other) applications where this seems more adequate.
12Here, "t;n stands for the n-th entry of the vector "t and t;k for k-th entry of the vector t.
18subject to the constraints (IP.1-e), (IP.2-e) and (IP.3)-(IP.5). This obtains a mini-
mization problem with a quadratic objective function and mixed linear programming
constraints. Again, solution methods for such problems are fairly standard.
Interestingly, the outcome of the minimization problem can also be used to statisti-
cally test the null hypothesis that rationalizability holds when accounting for measure-
ment error. To see this, let R represent the sum of squared errors associated with the
true prices (i.e. R =
P





Thus, for any critical value C taken from the given chi-squared distribution, we reject
the null hypothesis of rationalizability at a signicance level  as soon as R=2  C.
Of course, in practice we do not observe R or 2. However, we can use that, by





Then, following an original idea of Varian (1985), we can compute (for critical value C






Our above argument directly obtains that b  gives the standard deviation (of the mea-
surement errors "t and t) one minimally needs to account for in order not to reject the
null hypothesis that behavior is rationalizable. In practice, b  can be compared to one's
prior belief regarding the true standard deviation . If b  exceeds this prior belief, then
one can reject the null hypothesis for rationalizability (at the signicance level ), and
vice versa. It is worth pointing out that, clearly, this test procedure is fairly conserva-
tive; the null hypothesis of rationalizable behavior will be rejected only if there is strong
evidence against it.
Table 4 provides some key values for the empirical distribution of the measure b 
associated with signicance level  = 0:05. It reports for the subset of households that
fail the `sharp' GQL and QL tests. Recall that we used a multiplicative error structure,
which, from an interpretation point of view, implies that b  captures standard deviation
of the price errors in percentage terms.
We rst consider the GQL results. Here, we conclude that measurement errors may
eectively explain the rejections of the `sharp' test. Indeed, the maximum b  value
amounts to no more than 1;2%. In other words, the behavior of this `worst tting'
household can be rationalized in terms of transferable utility (or GQL utility) as soon as
we believe the price errors have a standard deviation of (minimally) 1;2%. In addition,
13The degrees of freedom equal the number of data points that are perturbed. In our application, we
consider 8 observations and 15 goods, which makes that we have 120 prices for which we allow errors.
19Table 4: Measurement error (^ )
mean min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
QL 0.0151 0.0001 0.004 0.009 0.0211 0.0603
GQL 0.0017 0 0.0001 0.0011 0.0026 0.0120
looking at the 3rd quartile value, we conclude rationalizability of 75% of the households
if we accept a standard deviation of only 0:3%. These are obviously very small numbers.
As such, this provides a strong empirical case for transferable utility in the case one
believes prices are measured with errors.
Let us then focus on the QL results. As a rst observation, we nd that the corre-
sponding values in Table 4 are everywhere above those for the GQL model. This falls
in line with the basic test results that we reported before, and so again suggests that
the GQL specication has better empirical support than he QL specication. However,
the b  values are often fairly low: while the maximum value in the sample equals is still
-in our opinion- reasonably high (6%), the other values are much lower (e.g. the mean
value is only 1:5%). Thus, if one believes prices are measured with error, the behavior
of many households can be rationalized in terms of the QL specication; a little degree
of price adjustments allows for such a rationalization. From this perspective, we may
conclude that for a substantial number of households there does not seem to be a very
strong empirical case against the QL specication when accounting for price errors.
What do we learn from all this? Our application allows for drawing both method-
ological and empirical conclusions. At the methodological level, we believe that our
application convincingly demonstrates the practical usefulness of our revealed prefer-
ence characterization for assessing the validity of transferable (or GQL) utility in real
life settings. Also, it shows that the conditions we derived above easily allow for analyz-
ing power and predictive success, and are directly extended to account for measurement
error in the consumption data. More generally, this illustrates that using our integer
programming formulation does not restrict the revealed preference analysis. Starting
from this formulation, we can empirically address the same type of questions (including
methodological extensions) as in more standard analysis of the unitary model of house-
hold consumption. In this respect, we also refer to our discussion in the concluding
section, where we touch upon recovery and forecasting analysis.
Next, at the empirical level, we have investigated the validity of the transferable
utility hypothesis, and hereby compared the performance of the GQL and QL specica-
tions for a particular sample of Spanish households. We conducted two complementary
exercises. The conclusions of our rst exercise, which focused on the basic tests without
measurement error, are quite clear-cut. A rst main conclusion is that the GQL speci-
cation is more useful than the QL specication, which is strongly rejected for our data.
20In fact, for a considerable subset of households the GQL specication performs rather
well empirically. However, if we focus on the `sharp' GQL test, there is also a substantial
amount of households that behave inconsistently with transferable utility. We were not
able to explain the observed violations of transferable utility by characteristics observed
in our data set. So, from this point of view, other (unobserved) characteristics may
dene (exact) consistency with the transferable utility specication.
Our second exercise took a very dierent perspective and investigated whether mea-
surement error in the price data can explain the observed violations of (GQL and QL)
rationalizability. Interestingly, we did nd that accounting for a little measurement error
can rationalize all household behavior in terms of transferable utility (i.e. obtains consis-
tency with the GQL condition). In fact, we also obtained a much stronger empirical case
pro the QL specication when considering a small amount of measurement error: for
most households in our sample, we can make the consumption behavior consistent with
the QL specication under small adjustments of the observed prices. Still, the necessary
price adjustments are fairly big for some households and, in general, they (sometimes
quite substantially) exceed those for the GQL specication. This falls in line with our
main nding of the rst exercise that, for the given sample, our empirical results suggest
a better t of the GQL specication than of the QL specication.
6 Conclusion
We have presented revealed preference conditions that must be satised by observed be-
havior to be consistent with transferable utility (or GQL utility) under Pareto eciency.
These conditions are easily veried by using integer programming techniques, which is
attractive from a practical point of view. This provides an easy-to-apply framework for
evaluating the empirical realism of the transferable utility hypothesis in observational
settings. As a side-result, our theoretical discussion also made clear how the transferable
utility model is situated `between' the quasi-linear (QL) and unitary model: its (revealed
preference) testable implications are weaker than the QL implications but stronger than
the unitary implications.
We have demonstrated the usefulness of our revealed preference framework by an
empirical application to Spanish households. Generally, our results suggest that the
assumption of transferable utility is a useful one for this sample of households. First,
when considering our basic revealed preference tests, which abstract from errors in the
consumption data, we concluded that a large class of households satises transferable
utility. We then investigated whether accounting for errors in the price data allowed
for rationalizing behavior that is not exactly consistent with transferable utility. Inter-
estingly, we found that this is eectively the case: we needed only small adjustments
of the observed prices to rationalize all household consumption behavior in terms of
transferable utility. In our opinion, these results provide rather favorable empirical sup-
port pro the transferable utility hypothesis for the data at hand.14 It seems interesting
14At this point, however, it is also worth to recall our qualication that the test procedure we used
to account for measurement error is a fairly conservative one. See our discussion in Section 5.
21to investigate whether these conclusions are conrmed for other household data (that
potentially imply more powerful revealed preference tests). We provided a framework
that allows for doing so in a fairly easy manner.
In our application, we also compared the empirical t of the GQL specication with
the one of the more restrictive QL specication. For the basic revealed preference tests,
we found quite an important dierence: none of the households appeared to be (ex-
actly) consistent with QL utility, while a substantial part of the households meet the
conditions for GQL utility. This dierence became much less pronounced when we ac-
counted for price errors. For many households, we found that small price adjustments
can obtain rationalizability in terms of the QL specication. Still, we needed fairly big
price adjustments for some households and, generally, the necessary adjustments were
(sometimes quite substantially) larger than those for the GQL specication. Taken to-
gether, these empirical results suggest a better t of the GQL specication than of the
QL specication.
We see dierent avenues for follow-up research. From an empirical point of view,
an in-depth investigation can provide more detailed insights into possible explanations
of violations of transferable utility. For example, one may use richer data sets than
the one we studied (e.g. involving additional consumption observations and/or house-
hold characteristics) to more thoroughly investigate the specic household characteristics
that dene the adequacy of the transferable utility model. We believe this is particu-
larly interesting given the wide use of the transferable utility hypothesis in (theoretical)
household economics. Next, as also indicated in the Introduction, our framework can
equally be used for assessing the validity of the transferable utility hypothesis in al-
ternative (non-household) settings where this assumption crucially underlies important
theoretical results.
Finally, to keep our exposition simple, our analysis has concentrated on the charac-
terization of transferable utility, and testing consistency of observed behavior with this
characterization. If observed behavior is found consistent with a behavioral hypothesis,
then natural next questions involve recovering/identifying the corresponding decision
model that rationalizes the observed consumption behavior, and to forecasting behavior
in new situations. In this respect, it is worth emphasizing that our revealed preference
characterization does allow for subsequent recovery and forecasting analysis. For ex-
ample, this analysis can develop along the lines of Varian (1982) and, more recently,
Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008), who use similar revealed preference methods
to consider such questions for the unitary model. In this respect, we recall from our
theoretical discussion that the GQL (or transferable utility) model has stronger testable
implications than the unitary model, which is usually considered in revealed preference
applications. As such, we can expect that using the GQL specication (when it cannot
be rejected) can eectively produce more vigorous recovery and forecasting results.
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24Appendix A: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
(2 ! 3). By convexity of the function (Q) and concavity of the function (q;Q) we
must have that for all observations t;v 2 T:
























. Then, substituting and using the rst order conditions (foc.1)-(foc.3)
demonstrates conditions (RP.1)-(RP.4).




















t + pt(q   qt) + 











The function  is convex and  is concave, hence u is quasi-concave. Further, it is
increasing in both q and Q. Finally, using a similar argument as Varian (1982, p.970),
we can derive that (Qt) = t and (qt;Qt) = t for all t 2 T
Given all this, we can prove the result ad absurdum. Suppose that S is not TU-
rationalizable. Then, there must exist an allocation fx;q;Qg such that x+ptq+PtQ <
xt + ptqt + PtQt and u(x;q;Q)  u(xt;qt;Qt) =  ut. We thus get
x + ptq + PtQ   ut(Q)   (q;Q) + ptq + PtQ








(Q   Qt)   pt(q   qt) + ptq + PtQ
= xt + ptqt + PtQt;
which gives the wanted contradiction. (The rst inequality combines u(x;q;Q) =
(x/(Q)) + ((q;Q)/(Q)) with u(x;q;Q)   ut, the second inequality uses (A.1)
and (A.2), and the nal equality uses (RP.3) and (RP.4).)




(Mqm;Q). Then, for all t 2 T and m  M, we set qm
t = qt/M and
xm
t = xt=M.
25Proof of Proposition 2
(1 ! 2) Assume that there exist numbers xt such that fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T is TU-
rationalizable. Then, it follows from Proposition 1 that there exist positive numbers t,







t   v  

v(Qt   Qv) (RP.1)
t   v  pv(qt   qv) + 





















t  ut translates condition
(RP.2) and (RP.3) into conditions (RP.6) and (RP.7). So we only need to demonstrate
condition (RP.5).
Multiplying (RP.1) by minus one, gives:





v (Qt   Qv)
Given this, setting A
t = 1/ ut > 0 and UA
t =  t   minvf vg  0 establishes
condition (RP.5).
(2 ! 1) Assume that there exist numbers UA
t ;UB
t and A





















v  pv(qt   qv) + P
B





t = Pt (RP.7)




t , we derive (RP.2).






 ut =  

t . Substitution in condition (RP.7)
gives condition (RP.3).





v )  

t (Qt   Qv) (A.3)
As  ut > 0, there exist a number  > 0 such that  ut >  for all t 2 T. Now, consider
a number z 2 R++ and dene t such that (i) t   UA
t + z > 0 (8t 2 T) and (ii)
0 < t/t  . These conditions can be guaranteed by taking z large enough. Using
this denition of t in condition (A.3) above gives condition (RP.1).
Finally, we dene xt such that
xt  t ut   t > 0;
which obtains condition (RP.4).
26Proof of Proposition 3
This result uses the equivalence of (RP.5) and GARP; this is stated more formally in
Theorem 1 below. Next, in the main text we argued that (IP.3)-(IP.5) do allow for
verifying GARP for our setting.
Appendix B: Conditions (RP.1)-(RP.4) imply GARP
From (RP.2) it follows that
(t + xt)   (v + xv)  pv(qt   qv) + 

v(Qt   Qv) + xt   xv:
Then, using (RP.4) we obtain
 utt    uvv  pv(qt   qv) + ()v(Qt   Qv) + xt   xv:
Next, adding to both sides  uv(v   t) and making use of (RP.1) gives
( ut    uv)t  pv(qt   qv) + 

v(Qt   Qv) +  uv(v   t) + xt   xv
 pv(qt   qv) + 

v(Qt   Qv)    uv

v(Qt   Qv) + xt   xv:
Finally, from (RP.3) we get
( ut    uv)t  pv(qt   qv) + Pv(Qt   Qv) + xt   xv:
(3)
Now, the above inequality shows that, if pvqv + PvQv + xv  pvqt + PvQt + xt,
then  uv   ut. Hence, if (qv;Qv;xv)R(qt;Qt;xt), then also  uv   ut. As such, if on the
contrary GARP is not satised, there must exist observations t and v 2 T such that
 uv   ut and  ut >  uv, a contradiction.
Appendix C: Afriat's Theorem
In the main text, we make use of Afriat's Theorem. This result was stated by Varian
(1982) and is based on the original work of Afriat (1967). It is probably the single most
important theorem in the revealed preference literature. To facilitate our exposition in
the main text, we briey recapture the result here. We refer to Varian (1982) for more
a more detailed discussion.
Let us consider a general setting with a price-quantity set Z as introduced in Section
5 of the main text. We consider the following rationalizability concept:
Denition 3 (U-rationalizable) The set Z = fwl;ylgl2L is utility (U)-rationalizable
if there exist a non-satiated utility function u such that each quantity bundle yl maximizes
the function u in the following sense: yl 2 argmaxy u(y) s:t: wly  wlyl.
27We can now state Afriat's Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Afriat's Theorem) Consider a set Z = fwl;ylgl2L. The following con-
ditions are equivalent:
1. The set Z is U-rationalizable;
2. The set Z satises GARP;
3. For all l 2 L, there exist Ul 2 R+ and l 2 R++ such that, for all l;k 2 L :
Ul   Uk  kwk(yl   yk):
4. There exist a strictly increasing, continuous and concave utility function that pro-
vides a U-rationalization for Z.
In Section 5 of our main text, we use two important implications of this result.
First, the equivalence between statements 1 (or 4) and 2 implies that a price-quantity
set Z is U-rationalizable by some utility function if and only if it is consistent with
GARP. Second, the equivalence between statements 2 and 3 means that the set Z is
consistent with GARP if and only if it satises a number of inequalities dened in
the unknowns Ul and l. These last inequalities are commonly referred to as `Afriat
inequalities' corresponding to the set Z. Intuitively, these Afriat inequalities allow us to
obtain estimates for the utility levels (Ul) and marginal utilities (l) attained at each l
whenever the set Z is rationalizable.
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